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Department of Defense, Inc.: The DoD's Use of
Corporate Strategies to Manage U.S. Overseas
Military Bases
MATT WEYAND*
ABSTRACT

This paper examines the Department of Defense's use of corporate
strategies to manage U.S. overseas military bases and concludes that the
Department of Defense's continued use of these corporate strategieswhich have negatively impacted the United States' relationship with host
nations-depends on the Department of Defense's ability to successfully
strike a balance between efficiency and diplomacy.
INTRODUCTION

The Department of Defense (DoD) operates and maintains nearly
1,000 overseas military bases.' Overseas military bases serve many
strategic functionS2 that contribute to one overarching purpose: to
provide security for U.S. citizens. The United States faced new security
threats,3 unlike those after World War II (WWII), when it laid the

* Executive Online Editor, Indiana Journalof Global Legal Studies; J.D. Candidate,
2012, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.A. magna cum laude, 2005, Santa
Clara University. I would like to thank Professor Alfred C. Aman for his guidance and
advice. I would also like to thank Allison Walker for her support and for proofreading the
initial drafts of this paper. Finally, I would like to thank my grandfathers, Lieutenant
General Alexander M. Weyand (Ret.) and Major General Eugene S. Korpal (Ret.), for their
service and for inspiring my general interest in military history and strategy.
1. CHALMERS JOHNSON, DISMANTLING THE EMPIRE: AMERICA'S LAST BEST HOPE 111
(2010) [hereinafter JOHNSON, EMPIRE].

2. For example, overseas military bases encircle enemies, reinforce the status quo,
serve as training centers for U.S. troops, and influence host nations. See Joseph Gerson,
U.S. Foreign Military Bases and Military Colonialism: Personal and Analytical
Perspectives, in THE BASES OF EMPIRE: THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE AGAINST U.S. MILITARY

POSTS 47, 54-56 (Catherine Lutz ed., 2009).
3. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 17 (2010)
[hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY].
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foundations of its current basing infrastructure. 4 In his 2010 National
Security Strategy, President Obama described these new threats to
American security: "Instead of a hostile expansionist empire, we now
face a diverse array of challenges, from a loose network of violent
extremists to states that flout international norms or face internal
collapse . . . the United States must now be prepared for asymmetric

threats."5 The nature of national security has changed, and the
American security state6 has adapted in response.
The DoD, the United States' oldest government agency,7 is the
organizational embodiment of the American security state. Since the
early 2000s, the DoD has transformed the U.S. military to better
operate in the new global security environment.8 As part of this
transformation, the DoD has reconfigured its overseas-basing posture.9
The American security state, as embodied by the DoD, has
dramatically changed its modus operandi in response to new security
risks. To economically and efficiently "manufacture" the "product"
known as security, the DoD has increasingly operated like a
transnational corporation: it has adopted the corporate strategies of
rightsizing,' 0 outsourcing, and offshoring. 11By rightsizing, outsourcing,
and offshoring, the DoD has accrued many of the same benefits as a
transnational corporation: it has been able to operate more efficiently,
more effectively, and more economically. But the DoD is not a
transnational corporation, and operating as such risks the breakdown of
cooperation, alliances, and diplomacy between the United States and
nations hosting U.S. bases.
4. See Catherine Lutz, Introduction: Bases, Empire, and Global Response to THE
BASES OF EMPIRE: THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE AGAINST U.S. MILITARY POSTS 1, 12 (Catherine
Lutz ed., 2009).
5. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 3, at 17.
6. The American security state provides national security for U.S. citizens. National
security "refers to organized political violence." See Jonathan Kirshner, Globalization and
National Security, in GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY 1, 2 (Jonathan Kirshner
ed., 2006). For a more detailed description of the security state, see Ian Clark, The
Security State, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
GLOBALIZATION DEBATE 177 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2003).
7. See About the Department of Defense, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEF.,
http://www.defense.gov/about/ (last visited July 31, 2010).

8. See Global Posture Review of United States Military Forces Stationed Overseas:
Hearing Before S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 108th Cong. 6 (2004) (statement of Donald H.
Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense) [hereinafter Global Posture Review of U.S. Military

Forces Stationed Overseas].
9. See id.
10. The Oxford English dictionary defines "rightsizing" as the process of "convert[ing]
to an appropriate or optimum size." OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1046 (3d ed. 2010).
11. See ILAN OSHRI ET AL., THE HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL OUTSOURCING AND OFFSHORING
4 (2009), for an applicable definitional outline of outsourcing and offshoring.
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This paper will show how the American security state has adapted
to the new global security environment by adopting corporate strategies
and will suggest the limitations that flow from its use of these
strategies. Part I provides a brief history of U.S. overseas military
bases, discusses the creation of the modern American security state, and
examines the relationship between overseas military bases and the
American security state. Part II describes the globalization of security,
the transformation of the U.S. military, and how the DoD's twenty-first
century overseas-basing structure is related to its twenty-first century
military strategy. Part III argues that the DoD is operating like a
transnational corporation to more effectively and efficiently
"manufacture" security in its overseas military bases. Part IV describes
how the DoD's current basing and diplomatic posture has negatively
impacted diplomatic relationships and suggests how the DoD can
improve and repair these relationships. Part V concludes with
observations about the future of U.S. overseas military bases.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. OVERSEAS MILITARY BASES AND THE
AMERICAN SECURITY STATE

Many of the bases currently in the DoD's possession were acquired
during WWII12 when the number of U.S. overseas military bases
increased to around 30,000 in 1945.13 After WWII, the United States
began retracting its network of overseas bases' 4 in response to pressure
abroad to relinquish overseas bases to local governments and pressure
at home to demobilize its massive military force. Within two years of
Victory over Japan Day (V-J Day), "[h]alf of the wartime basing was
gone . . . and half of what had been maintained until 1947 had been

dismantled by 1949."15
The modern American security state developed in the aftermath of
WWII and "was defined by the parameters of the Cold War."16 The
DoD's Cold War strategy of "containment, confrontation, and
intervention"1 7 was reflected in its overseas-basing posture: to counter a
Soviet military threat and to impede the spread of Communism, bases

12. See U.S. Military Bases and Empire, 53 MONTHLY REV. 1, 2 (2002).

13. See id.
14. See id. at 3.
15. JAMES R. BLAKER, UNITED STATES OVERSEAS BASING: AN ANATOMY OF THE
DILEMMA 32 (1990).

16. Robert G. Patman, Globalization, the End of the Cold War, and the Doctrine of
National Security, in GLOBALIZATION AND CONFLICT: NATIONAL SECURITY IN A "NEW"
STRATEGIC ERA 3, 5 (Robert G. Patman ed., 2006).

17. Id. at 6.
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were established and large troop masses were deployed to western
Europe and northeast Asia.' 8 The U.S. overseas-basing network further
expanded as a result of the Korean War, reaching 1947 levels by 1967.19
Expansion continued until the end of the Vietnam War. 20
The - end of the Cold War "dramatically altered the security
landscape that had shaped [the United States'] forward defense
posture."2 1 In the post-Cold War security environment, weak or failing
states, not superpowers, represented the greatest threats to national
security, 22 and identity politics and the "mobilization of movements
along ethnic, racial, and religious lines" predominantly drove conflicts. 23
In response to these threats, the United States acquired new bases
throughout the 1990s to support its military interventions against weak
or failing states in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. 24
II. THE GLOBALIZATION OF SECURITY AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE

MILITARY
Globalization is a "multifaceted enterprise that proceeds both
outside the state and within it, spurred on by businesses, consumers,
social groups, states, and international institutions as they organize the
economic, political, and cultural spheres beyond the nation-state."25
Globalization has changed the nature of security and the traditional role
of the state in providing it.26 Globalization has primarily affected the
security state in two ways: 1) it has undermined state authority and 2)
it has changed the nature of conflict. 27 Both of these changes have made
the security state (and hence, its citizenry) more vulnerable.
The security state's authority has diminished. Modern information
technology and the mobility of capital have undermined the state's
ability to control its economic destiny: "[w]here states were once the
masters of markets, now it is the markets which .

.

. are the masters

18. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., STRENGTHENING U.S. GLOBAL DEFENSE POSTURE 5 (2004)
(explaining the United States' defense posture throughout, and at the end of, the Cold
War).
19. See Lutz, supranote 4, at 14.

20. U.S. MilitaryBases and Empire, supra note 12, at 3.
21. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 18, at 5.
22. See Patman, supranote 16, at 11.
23. Id.

24. U.S. Military Bases and Empire, supranote 12, at 5.
25. NORRIN M. RIPSMAN & T.V. PAUL, GLOBALIZATION AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY
STATE 9 (2010).

26. See id. at 28.
27. See Kirshner, supranote 6, at 6.
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over . . . states."28 Moreover, "authority in society and over economic

transactions is legitimately exercised by agents other than states, and
has come to be freely acknowledged by those who are subject to it."29 In
this new global environment, the security state's ability to "manipulate
domestic politics and . . . to garner resources for war"30 has been limited.
Although the state still has a "'monopoly on the ability to legitimize
violence ... they do not have the ability to monopolize violence."'3 1
The nature of conflict has also changed. Interstate warfare, the
purpose of the traditional security state, is increasingly rare, 32 as wars
are no longer fought on battlefields by massive armies. Globalization
has also lowered the entry costs for state and nonstate actors to
engineer and acquire new weapons technologies, such as weapons of
mass destruction. 33 Transnational terrorist groups are especially skilled
at exploiting "globalization's assault on national borders to challenge
nation-states."34 In the new global security environment, weak states
"undermine the state from below, with smaller scale, open ended
conflicts maintained by external support, criminal networks, and
plunder."' 5
The nature of security has changed; in order to provide security for
its citizens, the U.S. military has been transformed. In response to the
new global security environment, the DoD created a new twenty-first
century defense strategy.36 As part of the new defense strategy, defense
planning shifted from a threat-based model to a capabilities-based
model.' 7 Under the capabilities-based model, the DoD focused "on how
an adversary might fight rather than specifically whom the adversary
might be or where a war might occur."' 8

28. SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF POWER IN THE
WORLD ECONOMY 4 (1996).

29. Susan

Strange,

The

Declining Authority of

States,

in

THE

GLOBAL

TRANSFORMATIONS READER: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION DEBATE 127, 133
(David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2003).
30. See Kirshner, supranote 6, at 6.
31. See Clark, supra note 6, at 183 (emphasis omitted) (citing Daniel Deudney,

PolticialFission:State Structure, Civil Society, and Nuclear Security Politics in the United
States, in On Security 87, 97 (Ronnie D. Lipschultz ed., 1995)).
32. See RIPSMAN, supra note 25, at 23.

33. See id. at 50.
34. Id.
35. Kirshner, supra note 6, at 9.
36. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 2001 III,
3-10 (2001) [hereinafter QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT].

37. See id. at IV, 13-14.
38. Id. at IV.
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The DoD's transformation efforts were "built on several conceptual
pillars, foremost among them agility, flexibility, and speed."39 The
transformed United States military would be a "more agile, more
efficient force," one "that is ready and able to combat the asymmetric
challenges of this new and uncertain time."40 A key step in transforming
the military was to identify new ways to deter conflict.41 However,
conflict deterrence would still primarily depend upon the power of
military presence: "[d]eterrence in the future will continue to depend
heavily upon . . . forward stationed and forward deployed combat and
expeditionary forces . . . along with the rapidly employable capabilities

that the U.S. military possess throughout the globe." 42
Military presence ultimately depends on military bases; however, in
the new global security environment, the United States cannot
anticipate where wars might occur. Consequently, the DoD's new
defense posture "emphasiz[es] long-term military access to countries
over long-term military presence within countries" 43 and therefore
allows for strategic flexibility.
III. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: A TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATION
The DoD is the largest government agency in the United States and
one of the largest organizations in the world. The DoD:
manages twice the budget of the world's largest
corporation, employs more people than the population of
a third of the world's countries, provides medical care for
as many patients as the largest health management
organization, and carries five hundred times the number
of inventory items as the world's largest commercial
retail operation. 44

39. See Gerson, supra note 2, at 63.
40. Global Posture Review of U.S. Military Forces Stationed Overseas, supra note 8, at
6.
41. See QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT, supra note 36, at 25.

42. Id.
43. Todd W. Fields, EastwardBound: The Strategy and Politics of Repositioning U.S.
Military Bases in Europe, 15 J. PUB. & INT'L AFF. 79, 82 (2004).
44. JACQUES
17 (2009).

S.

GANSLER & WILLIAM LUcYSHYN, DEFENSE BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION
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It operates out of the Pentagon, one of the world's largest office
buildings. 45 And, since the early 2000s, it has operated like a
transnational corporation.
The DoD is in the security industry: it "manufactures" the product
known as security. It faces new competitors (China) and new obstacles
(a weakened U.S. economy). 46 China's "soft" power continues to increase:
"[a]ll over the globe . . . the Chinese are becoming masters of indirect
influence-by establishing business communities and diplomatic
outposts, by negotiating construction and trade agreements. Pulsing

with consumer and martial energy . . . China constitutes the principal
conventional threat to America's liberal imperium."47 National security
and the national economy are linked: if one is weak, so is the other. 48 To
continue to compete in the security market, the DoD must modernize
and streamline its military infrastructure; it must transform the U.S.
military. The DoD is restructuring its overseas-basing posture to
accomplish this.
The DoD is rightsizing bases, outsourcing base labor, and offshoring

bases primarily to achieve its strategic goals; for the DoD, these
techniques are an end unto themselves. Security is the "dividend" the
DoD pays to its "shareholders," U.S. citizens. These corporate strategies
are also economical and distribute savings on the manufacturing of
security to the shareholders. Rightsizing and outsourcing reduces costs,
while offshoring avoids them. Transnational corporations, on the other
hand, rightsize, outsource, and offshore to reduce costs and increase
profits for shareholders; for transnational corporations, these
techniques are a means to an end. The DoD's transformation efforts,
which emphasizes flexibility, agility, and efficiency, echoes the
operational
objectives
of many
transnational
corporations.
Consequently, the DoD is operating like a transnational corporation by
using these corporate techniques to manage its overseas bases.

45. See About the Departmentof Defense, supra note 7 (last visited Dec. 2, 2010).
46. See generally, e.g., Obama Says U.S. Economic Fix Could Take Years, REUTERS,
Dec. 9, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/10/usa-economy-obamaidUSNlE7B80WK20111210.
47. Robert D. Kaplan, How We Would Fight China, ATLANTIC MAG., June 2005, at 49,

49.
48. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 3, at 10 ("Rebuilding our economy must
include putting ourselves on a fiscally sustainable path. As such, implementing our
national security strategy will require a disciplined approach to setting priorities and
making tradeoffs among competing programs and activities. Taken together, these efforts
will position our nation for success in the global marketplace, while also supporting our
national security capacity-the strength of our military, intelligence, diplomacy and
development, and the security and resilience of our homeland.").
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A. Rightsizing

Like a transnational corporation rightsizing (i.e., reducing its
workforce to the optimum size) in response to a new economic
environment, the DoD is rightsizing in response to a new security
environment: it is creating new types of bases, it is closing bases that
are no longer effectively "manufacturing" security, and it is
restructuring those that remain open. The 2004 Global Posture Review
and the conclusions of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closing
Commission (BRAC) illustrate the DoD's rightsizing efforts, which are
integral to executing its new defense strategy.
1. The 2004 Global PostureReview

The changes enacted by the 2004 Global Posture Review represent
the "'biggest restructuring of America's global forces since 1945."'49 The
Global Posture Review is "intended to reduce United States overseas
forces over a six-to-eight-year period from the numbers and locations of
overseas bases . . . left over from the Cold War to new locations

optimized to support current allies and confront new potential threats."
More specifically, the Global Posture Review would return 70,000 troops
to the United States, close 300 overseas military bases, and save $1
billion per year.s0
Restructuring America's global forces requires diversifying U.S.
military bases.51 Consequently, the DoD has developed "plans for a more
flexible and effective force posture for the twenty-first century."52 This
new posture calls for the DoD to operate and maintain three types of
military bases: Main Operating Bases (MOBs), Forward Operating Sites
(FOSs), and Collaborative Security Locations (CSLs).
MOBs have "permanently stationed combat forces, extensive
infrastructure

.

.

. command

and

control

headquarters,

and

accommodations for families."53 The Ramstein Air Base in Germany and
the Kadena Air Base in Japan are examples of MOBs. 54

49. CHALMERS JOHNSON, NEMESIS: THE LAST DAYS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 144
(2006) [hereinafter JOHNSON, NEMESIS] (quoting Secretary of Defense Donald H.
Rumsfeld).
50. See ROBERT D. CRITCHLOW, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33148, U.S. MILITARY
OVERSEAS BASING: NEW DEVELOPMENTS AND OVERSIGHT ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 2 (2005).
51. See generally Gerson, supra note 2, at 60 (discussing a variety of ways America's
overseas military bases might be changed and diversified).

52. Global Posture Review of U.S. Military Forces Stationed Overseas, supra note 8, at
5.
53. JOHNSON, NEMESIS, supranote 49, at 145.
54. Id.
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The DoD would also establish a network of FOSs. FOSs are
"expandable host-nation 'warm site[s]' with a limited U.S. military
support presence and possibly prepositioned equipment."55 Troops would
"deploy to these bases for temporary duty (typically one year or less,
unaccompanied by families)."56 In essence, they are just smaller
MOBs.57
Finally, the DoD would create CSLs. A CSL can be "a tucked-away
corner of a host country's civilian airport, or a dirt runway somewhere
with fuel and mechanical help nearby, or a military airport."5 8 These
bases, which are also known as "lily pads,"59 are inexpensive, flexible,
and scalable.60 Lily pads provide a stable location to which "our troops
[can] jump like so many well-armed frogs from the homeland or our
major bases elsewhere."6 ' These bases have little or no permanent U.S.
troop presence, are maintained by host nation personnel or private
contractors, 62 and house prepositioned ammunition and weapons that
U.S. troops can access only in times of emergency.63
CSLs also serve diplomatic purposes. As part of the process of
establishing a CSL, the U.S. military will upgrade the host nation's
military installations, facilitate joint-training exercises with the host
nation's military, and engage in humanitarian work in the area. In
essence, the military's actions in nations hosting CSLs are directed
towards cultivating the nation's goodwill, so that the United States can

get "the host country's approval for use of the base when and if [it]
need[s] it."64
2. The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission
In 1988, Congress created the BRAC, "an independent group of ...

commissioners, consisting of former legislators, members of the business
community,

retired

military

personnel,

and

former

presidential

55. Global Posture Review of U.S. Military Forces Stationed Overseas, supra note 8, at
7 (statement of General James L. Jones, Jr., USMC).
56. CRITCHLOW, supra note 50, at 2.
57. See JOHNSON, NEMESIS, supra note 49, at 146 (discussing the differences between
Forward Operating Sites and Main Operating Bases).
58. Kaplan, supranote 47, at 49.
59. JOHNSON, NEMESIS, supranote 49, at 147.
60. Global Posture Review of U.S. Military Forces Stationed Overseas, supra note 8, at
6 (statement of Donald H. Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Defense) (discussing some of the advantages
of Forward Operating Sites).
61. See JOHNSON, NEMESIS, supranote 49, at 147.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. Kaplan, supranote 47, at 49.

400

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 19:1

appointees." 65 The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990
governs the BRAC process. 66 The BRAC was created to serve as an
impartial administrative body responsible for reviewing and analyzing
the DoD's recommended list of bases and military installations to be
closed or realigned.67 As part of its review, the BRAC is required to
assess whether the DoD's recommendations meet certain statutory
selection criteria. During the review process, the BRAC can add
installations to the DoD's list.
There have been BRAC closing or realignment rounds in 1988, 1991,
1993, 1995, and 2005.68 The 2005 BRAC, which has been the largest yet,
affected twenty to twenty-five percent of the DoD's military
installations. The primary purpose behind the 2005 BRAC was military
transformation@: it allowed the DoD to 'rationaliz[e] [U.S. military]
infrastructure with [the DoD's] defense strategy."' 70 Per the 2005 BRAC,
the DoD will close or realign 182 military bases by September 2011.71
These base closures and realignments are estimated to result in an
annual savings of $4.2 billion. 72
B. Outsourcing
The DoD, "like the best companies . . . in the United States," 73 is
constantly looking for ways to "manufacture" security as cheaply and
efficiently as possible. The DoD, like many transnational corporations,74
found the solution in outsourcing. Outsourcing is the process through
which organizations contract with third-party service providers "for the
management and completion of a certain amount of work, for a specified
65. LILY J. GOREN, THE POLITICS OF MILITARY BASE CLOSINGS: NOT IN MY DISTRICT 1
(2003).

66. See Office of the Secretary of Defense: Base Realignment and Closure Frequently
Asked Questions, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEF., http://www.defense.govlbrac/02faqs.htm (last
visited Dec. 13, 2010).
67. See About the Commission, DEF. BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION,
http://www.brac.gov/About.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2010).
68. See DAVID M. BEARDEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RS22065, MILITARY BASE
CLOSURES: CLEANUP OF CONTAMINATED PROPERTIES FOR CIVILIAN REUSE 1 (2008).
69. See BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMM'N, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2005, pt 1, at
iii (2005) [hereinafter BRAC EXECUTIVE SUMMARY].
70. George Cahlink, Pentagon Sees Base Closing as Critical To Larger Strategy, NAT'L

J., Jan. 30, 2004, available at http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0104/013004gl.htm
(quoting Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) Philip
Grone).
71. See BRAC EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 69, at iii.

72. See id.
73. 11 DEP'T OF DEF., IMPROVING THE COMBAT EDGE THROUGH OUTSOURCING 1(1996).
74. See OSHRI, supra note 11, at 4.
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length of time, cost, and level of service." 75 Outsourcing generates
savings, provides flexibility, reduces training costs, 76 and thus allows an
organization to "obtain higher levels of performance at a lower cost with
relatively little upheaval for the organisation."77
Outsourcing has become an integral part of modern DoD operations.
After September 11, 2001, the DoD turned to private defense companies
to supplement its in-house defense force.7 8 Between 2000 and 2005, the
DoD's contracting budget grew by 102.3 percent.7 9 The DoD has hired
contractors to perform "core military tasks and . . . orchestrate

operations."80 It has contracted with private corporations for weapons
and technology development and management. 8 ' In the war in
Afghanistan, private contractors "served in paramilitary units . . .
maintained combat equipment, provided logistical support, and worked
on surveillance and targeting."8 2
The DoD has used private contractors to operate, secure, build, and
maintain overseas bases. In Iraq, the DOD employed over 39,000
private contractors to perform "base support functions such as
maintaining the grounds, running dining facilities, and performing
laundry services." 83 Private contractors have provided base security8 4
and constructed military bases in Iraq.88 Most notably, Kellogg, Brown,
and Root (KBR), an engineering and construction firm, has been highly
involved in the construction of these bases. The DoD has paid KBR at
least $4.5 billion to construct and maintain U.S. bases in Iraq and
Afghanistan. KBR has built some of the largest military installations in
Iraq, including Camp Victory North. Camp Victory North is a "small
American city," capable of housing 14,000 troops.8 6 KBR has been
75. Id.

76. Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: Privatizing Military Efforts and the Risks to
Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT:
OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 110, 113-14 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow
eds., 2009) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of privatizing the delivery of
government services).
77. RONAN MCIVOR, THE OUTSOURCING PROCESS: STRATEGIES FOR EVALUATION AND
MANAGEMENT 1 (2005).
78. See Minow, supra note 76, at 112.
79. Id. at 110.
80. Id. at 112.

81. See id.
82. Id.
83. MOSHE SCHWARTZ & JOYPRADA SWAIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40764,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: BACKGROUND AND
ANALYSIS 15 (2011).
84. See Minow, supra note 76, at 112.
85. See JOHNSON, NEMESIS, supra note 49, at 159.
86. Id at 161.
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involved in the construction of Camp al-Rasheed, Camp Cook, Balad
Airbase, Camp Anaconda, and Camp Marez.87
The DoD has also been outsourcing the maintenance of CSLs.
Retired U.S. noncommissioned officers88 who are maintenance experts,
speak the native language fluently, and are generally well-liked by
members of the local community frequently operate CSLs. The
contractor rents military facilities from the host nation's military, and
charges a fee for the U.S. military's use of the facilities.89
The use of private contractors as gatekeepers to CSLs and to host
nations allows the DoD to sidestep steep monetary and political
transaction costs. Private contractors charge low fees in comparison to
the costs associated with feeding, outfitting, monitoring, and paying
DoD employees. Furthermore, citizens of host nations are often
suspicious of U.S. troops at best, and resentful of them, at worst. Many
host nations have a complex relationship with the DoD. Private
contractors allow the host nations to indirectly work with the DoD.90
This allows local politicians to condemn the U.S. military presence while
simultaneously reaping the benefits from it. Finally, private contractors
prevent "incidents," such as the rape of local women, from happening by
steering U.S. troops to the "right hotels and bars, and advising them on
how to behave."9' Criminal acts by U.S. troops stationed overseas have
had a deleterious effect on United States-host nation relations.9 2 In
some instances, such acts have resulted in "some of the largest antiAmerican demonstrations in postwar history."93
C. Offshoring
The closure of a domestic base is politically charged and contentious,
and military bases contaminate the soil on which they are built.94 After
a base is closed, environmental cleanup is expensive and often

87. See id. at 161-62.
88. See KAPLAN, supra note 47, at 49.

89. See id.
90. See id (explaining how operating through a private contractor allows a host nation
to avoid the appearance of working with the U.S. military or government).
91. Id.
92. See JOHNSON, NEMESIS, supranote 49, at 179-80.
93. Id. at 179.

94. See, e.g., Katherine T. McCaffrey, Environmental Struggle After the Cold War: New
Forms of Resistance to the U.S. Military in Vieques, Puerto Rico, in THE BASES OF EMPIRE:
THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE AGAINST U.S. MILITARY POSTS 218, 237 (Catherine Lutz ed.,
2009)(describing the United States military's environmental damage to Vieques, Puerto
Rico).
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ineffective.9 5 The closure of an overseas military base, on the other
hand, is not politically contentious in the same way domestic base
closures are and the U.S. military, through clever legal maneuvers, has
made itself judgment-proof for any pollution associated with its overseas
military bases. Thus, by having bases offshore, the DoD can reduce
political and environmental transaction costs.
Overseas bases, by definition, are already offshore. They exist to
provide force projection and to protect American interests; cost
avoidance is an attendant boon. On the other hand, transnational
corporations have offshore operations to decrease costs and increase
efficiencies. Although the DoD and transnational corporations have
different reasons for offshoring, both enjoy the same benefits. Thus, in
this mediated sense, the DoD is using offshoring to manage overseas
military bases. By avoiding these costs, the DoD can manufacture
security more economically.
1. The Transaction Costs of Domestic Base Closings
Domestic base closures are the "political equivalents of earthquakes,
volcanic eruptions, or category five hurricanes."9 6 News of a domestic
base closure elicits "panic-stricken lamentations among politicians of
both parties . . . and the business and labor communities of the places

where military facilities are to be shut down. All of them plead 'save our
base."'9 7 States fight to keep their bases open. California Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger used his 2004 State of the State Address to
comment on the specter of military base closures in California:
The Pentagon will make the next round of base closures
in 2005 . . . . This could mean thousands of lost jobs to
California. These bases are important to national
defense, and they are important to our steady economic
recovery. As a state, we will fight to keep our bases
open.98
California is not the only state that has vowed to keep its bases open.
Florida, Texas, and Arizona have taken action by "hiring lobbyists,

95. See id. at 237 (discussing the difficulties and costs involved in cleaning up depleted
uranium).
96. See JOHNSON, NEMESIS, supra note 49, at 138 (citing George Cahlink, Pentagon
Certifies Need for Base Closures,Gov'T EXECUTIVE MAG., Mar. 23, 2004).
97. Id. at 137-38.
98. See CAHLINK, supranote 70, at 34.
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launching 'save-our-base' campaigns, and investing millions of dollars in
nearby infrastructure improvements."99
Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA), the federal government is required to clean
up a domestic military base before it is transferred to nonfederal
entities. The DoD typically undertakes this duty for military bases.100
After the property is transferred, the United States remains liable for
any remaining contamination.10 1 CERCLA requires the DoD to clean up
the site until the level of contamination does not pose risks to human
health or the environment.102 The extent of cleanup required depends on
the planned uses for the site; residential uses have more stringent
requirements than industrial uses.
Cleanup may be delayed or prolonged over many years.' 0
Commercial redevelopment is dependent on site cleanup, and the
recovery of the local economy is often dependent on redevelopment.
Consequently, recovery is usually impossible until cleanup is complete;
however, CERCLA does authorize transfer before the cleanup under
certain conditions. 104 Transferring before cleanup can facilitate the
redevelopment process when cleanup and development can be done
concurrently. 105
Base cleanup is expensive. 06 There have been five BRAC closing
rounds, and the total cost of base cleanup for those rounds is over $11
billion.107
2. Avoiding Costs Overseas
By building and operating overseas bases, the United States can
avoid the political transaction costs associated with domestic base
closures as the closure of an overseas base does not negatively affect the
99. Id.
100. See DAVID M. BEARDEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22065, MILITARY BASE
CLOSURES: CLEANUP OF CONTAMINATED PROPERTIES FOR CIVILIAN REUSE 2 (2008)
(discussing the implications of the 1986 amendment to the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the requirements imposed by
this act on the United States with regard to contaminated federal property).
101. See id.

102. See id. at 3.
103. See id. at 6 (the level of contamination of a site, the capabilities of cleanup
technologies, and funding are factors that may affect how quickly a cleanup might occur).
104. See id. at 2.
105. See id.

106. See Katherine T. McCaffrey, Environmental Struggle After the Cold War: New
Forms of Resistance to the U.S. Military in Vieques, Puerto Rico, in THE BASES OF EMPIRE:
THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE AGAINST U.S. MILITARY POSTS 218, 237 (Catherine Lutz ed., 2009).
107. Id. at 6.
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American economy. However, overseas military bases disconcert some
Americans: they are concerned with the cost of keeping them open and
are clamoring for many of them to be closed. 0 8
The United States also is able to usually avoid costs by contracting
out of liability for any pollution associated with its overseas military
bases. Prior to building or using an overseas military base, the United
States negotiates a contract with the host nation. 09 This contract,
which creates an "alliance" between the United States and the host
nation, is a "short, straightforward treat[y] that express[es] 'common
objectives' related to 'national security' and 'international threats to the
peace."' 10
Once the United States has formed an "alliance" with the host
nation, it negotiates a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The SOFA
"establishes the framework under which armed forces operate within a
foreign country""'; it ensures that U.S. personnel present in a host
nation have rights and legal protections.11 2 Although the United States
shares jurisdiction with some countries, it primarily uses the SOFA to
retain exclusive jurisdiction, and to "put any U.S. forces stationed in the
host country as far beyond its domestic laws as possible.""'s SOFAs
undermine the host nation's sovereignty," 4 and thus inevitably "give
rise to explosive political disputes."" 5 Host nations must also engage in
"burden sharing" with the United States." 6 Under "burden sharing,"
host nations pay the United States to support its presence in their
country.11 7 In 2002, Japan, which spends the largest amount of any
country, paid $4.4 billion.
Many host nations, including major players such as Germany and
Japan, are becoming increasingly frustrated with the U.S. military's
"above the law" attitude. Under Germany's SOFA with the United States,
the United States is responsible for environmental and noise pollution.118
108. See generally, e.g., David Vine, Too Many Overseas Bases, FOREIGN POL'Y Focus
(Feb. 25, 2009), http://www.fpif.orglarticles/too-many-overseasbases.
109. See JOHNSON, EMPIRE, supranote 1, at 117.
110. JOHNSON, NEMESIS, supra note 49, at 171.
111. See R. CHUCK MASON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34531, STATUS OF FORCES
AGREEMENT (SOFA): WHAT IS IT, AND How HAS IT BEEN UTILIZED? 5 (2011).
112. Id.
113. See JOHNSON, NEMESIS, supra note 49, at 171.
114. See id. at 176 (describing the sovereign rights of host nations that are often
infringed upon by SOFAs).
115. Id.
116. See id. at 150.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 174 (explaining that "the [SOFA] agreements [between] individual
European countries [and the U.S.] do not contain exemptions from responsibility for
environmental and noise pollution").
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Nevertheless, the U.S. military has polluted the land around its bases in
Germany and has refused to clean it up. Germany's ire with the U.S.
military has kicked off a race to the bottom among the poorer countries in
Eastern Europe, such as Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania, which have less
stringent environmental regulations. 119 These countries are "poor and
desperate enough to be willing .

.

. to let the Americans pollute as they

wish, cost free, in order to get what economic benefits they can." 120
The United States has polluted in Japan. The U.S. military has used
the reservoir of the Fukuchi Dam, which provides water to the residents
of Okinawa, for training exercises, and "significant amounts of
discarded munitions have been discovered in the surrounding
watershed area."121 However, Japan is powerless to prevent this
pollution or to compel the United States to remediate the environmental
damage it causes. In their SOFA with Japan, the United States
explicitly contracted away liability for any environmental damage its
military bases might cause.122
According to Article 18 (5)(3) of the SOFA, Japanese citizens have
the power to sue and collect damages from the United States. 123
However, despite this provision in the SOFA, Japanese citizens are also
powerless to hold the United States liable for its environmental
degradations. Although many successful suits have been brought
(including one assessing more than $24 million in damages), the United
States will not pay.124 From the United States' perspective, "it is
'strange' that the American military should have to pay damages for
practicing warfare to protect Japan."125
IV. THE DARK SIDE OF EFFICIENCY: THE END OF COOPERATION
The DoD's twenty-first century global posture, which "emphasiz [els
long-term military access to countries," relies heavily on the cooperation

119. See id. at 149.
120. Id. at 174.
121. Id. at 173.
122. Article 6 of the SOFA, the section containing the "no liability" provision, reads:
"The United States is not obliged, when it returns facilities and areas ... to restore the
facilities and areas to the condition in which they were at the time they became available.
or to compensate Japan ... in lieu of such restoration." Id. at 172.
123. Article 18 (5)(3) of the SOFA reads: "Where the United States alone is responsible
[in a civil claims case], the amount awarded or adjudged shall be distributed in the
proportion of 25 percent chargeable to Japan and 75 percent chargeable to the United
States." Id. at 173.
124. See id.
125. Id.
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and goodwill of host nations.1 26 However, the DoD's overseas military
bases create many negative externalities, which host nations are
ultimately forced to absorb. Consequently, countries worldwide have
become increasingly hostile toward U.S. overseas military bases. 127 In
order for the DoD to continue to economically manufacture security
using the corporate strategies of rightsizing, outsourcing, and
offshoring, a balance must be struck between efficiency and diplomacy.
This section consists of two subsections. The first subsection
describes how the DoD's current basing and diplomatic posture has
negatively impacted diplomatic relationships with host nations and how
U.S. responses to these negative externalities have caused diplomatic
relations to further deteriorate. The second subsection suggests how the
DoD can improve and sustain diplomatic relations by striking the
proper balance between efficiency and diplomatic decency.
A. Negative Externalities
Overseas military bases create negative social externalities in host
nations. Perhaps the most representative example of these negative
social externalities is the history of military violence against the women
of Okinawa, Japan.128 Since the U.S. occupation at the end of WWII,
Okinawan women have been the victims of military violence. Between
WWII and the Korean War, sexual and physical violence against
Japanese women was "rampant and indiscriminate."129 In recent years,
date-rape violence has been increasing. 30 The most notorious and
reprehensible incident of rape occurred in September 1995 when two
Marines and a sailor "abducted a twelve-year-old girl they picked out at
random, beat and raped her, and left her on a beach."13 ' After the rape,
the United States invoked Article 17 of their Japanese SOFA-which
gives the United States jurisdiction over crimes committed by U.S.
troops in Okinawa-and refused to surrender the soldiers to Japanese
authorities.132 The rape and the U.S. military's response to it shocked
the
people
of
Okinawa,
incited
massive
anti-American
126. See FIELDS, supra note 43, at 82.

127. See Lutz, supra note 4, at 31 (listing examples of countries and events which
demonstrate hostility to a U.S. military presence).
128. See Kozue Akibayashi & Suzuyo Takazato, Okinawa: Women's Struggle For
Demilitarization, in THE BASES OF EMPIRE: THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE AGAINST U.S.

MILITARY PosTS 243, 261 (Catherine Lutz ed., 2009) (describing the prevalent and overt
forms of violence committed against Okinawan women by American service members).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 262.
131. Johnson, NEMESIS, supranote 49, at 179.
132. See id.
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demonstrations,133 and spearheaded a movement to expel U.S. troops
from the island. 134 In 2005, after ten years of unrest and continuing
military violence against Okinawan women, the United States agreed to
transfer, over a six-year period, thousands of U.S. troops from Okinawa
to Guam.
Overseas military bases also create negative environmental
externalities. Perhaps the most representative example of these
negative environmental externalities is the history of U.S. military
pollution in Vieques, Puerto Rico. For sixty years, the island of Vieques
was the home of a U.S. Navy live-bombing range and an ammunition
facility, 3 5 and over those sixty years, the U.S. Navy's pollution greatly
damaged the local ecosystem. 136 On the western side of the island, the
U.S. Navy disposed of nearly "[two] million pounds of military and
industrial waste."137 In 2005, the Environmental Protection Agency
listed the Navy's live-bombing range, which was located on the eastern
side of Vieques, as one of the most hazardous waste sites in the United
States. 38 The land and water surrounding the range have been
extensively polluted: "[c]oral reefs and sea-grass beds have sustained
significant damage from bombing, sedimentation, and chemical
contamination. The groundwater has been contaminated by nitrates and
explosives."139 Furthermore, the range has been "seriously contaminated
by heavy metals" such as depleted uranium, and "studies have
documented that those metals have entered the food chain."140 In May
2003, after years of protests and demonstrations, the U.S. Navy was
expelled from Vieques.141
The United States has not responded diplomatically to complaints
about the negative externalities caused by its overseas-basing.
In response to the rape of the twelve-year-old Okinawan girl,
General Richard Meyers, commander of U.S. forces in Japan, said "this
was a singular tragedy caused by 'three bad apples' even though he
knew that sexually violent crimes committed by U.S. soldiers against
Okinawans were running at the rate of two per month."142 And, Admiral
Richard Macke, commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, said: "I think
133. See id.
134. See Akibayashi & Takazato, supra note 128, at 260.
135. See McCaffrey, supranote 106, at 234.
136. See id (explaining that constant bombing "devastated" the area and left "spent
shells and live bombs ... bomb craters and toxic-waste").
137. Id. at 235.
138. Id. at 236.
139. Id.
140. Id.

141. Id. at 233.
142. See JOHNSON, NEMESIS, supra note 49, at 180.
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that [the rape] was absolutely stupid. For the price they paid to rent the
car [with which to abduct their victim], they could have had a girl."143
These impolitic comments only served to fuel the fire of outrage in
Okinawa.
High-ranking officers responded to the claims of the Vieques
movement by arguing, in effect, that the United States military is the
victim, not the people of Vieques. According to the U.S. military, civilian
encroachment on the military installations on Vieques undermined the
military's ability to use these installations for training. 144
B. The Balance between Efficiency and Diplomacy: Respect Allies and
Follow the Law
It will be difficult for the DoD to find the balance between efficiency
and diplomacy. On one hand, the DoD's new overseas-basing strategy
and its use of rightsizing, outsourcing, and offshoring to manage its
overseas military bases have reduced overhead and allowed the DoD to
manufacture security more economically. On the other hand, the DoD's
overseas-basing strategy and the negative externalities caused by
overseas bases have resulted in the United States military being
expelled from many countries.
It is tempting for the DoD to continue to cut diplomatic corners;
however, cutting corners has cost the DoD the cooperation of allies, and
in order for the DoD to continue manufacturing security, it will need the
cooperation of foreign countries more than ever. If the DoD does not
redress the wrongs created by overseas military bases and work to
prevent similar wrongs from occurring in the future, it will not be able
to fully actualize and maintain its overseas-basing posture, and will
therefore not be able to provide security to American citizens. Because
the DoD is closing many overseas bases and creating smaller bases with
no permanent troop presence, many of the issues associated with
overseas military bases, such as pollution and rape, might become moot.
Nevertheless, the DoD will still maintain major bases in foreign
countries, and if the DoD does not find the balance between efficiency
and diplomacy, the continued presence of these bases will be
jeopardized. Consequently, to achieve the necessary balance between
efficiency and diplomacy, the United States must: 1) discontinue the use
of SOFAs, or at the very least, engage in fair bargaining practices and
forge bilateral SOFAs with all host nations; 2) consistently and
transparently prosecute U.S. troops for crimes committed in host
143. Id.
144. See McCaffrey, supra note 106, at 230.
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nations; and 3) clean up overseas military bases and prevent pollution
from occurring in the future.
SOFAs allow the DoD to impose its will on host nations, to
undermine the host nation's sovereignty, and to cause diplomatic strife.
Thus, SOFAs inherently undermine the alliance between the United
States and the host nation. In an ideal world, the United States would
discontinue the use of SOFAs. However, this may not be possible or
practical. Consequently, the United States must, at the very least,
engage in a meaningful SOFA-bargaining process with host nations: it
must form a true alliance with the host nation, an alliance based on
mutual trust and assurances. As part of this bargaining process, burden
sharing can be used as a bargaining chip. For example, a host nation
may allow the United States to opt out of some liability for pollution if
the United States pledges to minimize pollution and does not require
the host nation to engage in burden sharing. Moreover, to ensure
goodwill and continued cooperation, the DoD should forge bilateral
SOFAs with all host nations, not just with countries that have the
power to bargain for them. The United States must carefully guard its
reputation abroad-if prospective host nations know that the United
States has a history of polluting, it will be more difficult to enlist them
as our allies.
If the United States is going to continue to demand immunity for its
American troops overseas, at the very least, it must consistently
prosecute troops who commit crimes in a host nation. U.S. troops must
be held accountable for any criminal acts they commit in host nations,
and the United States High Command should establish a top-down
policy of instructing troops that they will be prosecuted for crimes they
commit. By putting U.S. soldiers on notice, the United States will
increase the likelihood that they will not commit crimes. Collaborating
with the host nation's law enforcement, and transparently prosecuting
U.S. troops will ensure that the host nation's citizens will feel that
justice has been served. Because the DoD's new defense strategy is so
dependent upon the cooperation of host nations, the United States must
actively foster goodwill and trust. If the United States does not win the
hearts and minds of the local populace, it will continue to risk being
expulsed from host nations, as it was in Japan.
Although cleaning up overseas military bases will be expensive, not
doing so will jeopardize relations with host nations. If the DoD pollutes,
it must cleanup after itself. Prevention is often cheaper than
remediation, so the DoD should establish procedures for the proper
disposal of military and industrial waste. The DoD could design these
procedures based on U.S. environmental law or the laws of the host
nations. As a sign of good will, the DoD should follow the more stringent
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of either its laws or the laws of the host nation. Countries will be more
willing to allow the United States to build bases on their soil if the
United States has a record of not polluting or, at the very least, a record
of cleaning up after itself.145
V. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF U.S. OVERSEAS MILITARY BASES
The DoD is at a crossroads: it can continue on its current trajectory
and risk the end of cooperation, or it can make deviations, right its
wrongs, and ensure cooperation. Unlike a transnational corporation, the
DoD cannot literally become bankrupt; however, if it is not managed
properly, it no longer will manufacture security and, effectively, become
bankrupt.
Unless the U.S. economy improves, the DoD will face increasing
pressure to shut down overseas bases for economic, not strategic
reasons. In fact, there is already mounting pressure to do so. 146 The
DoD's large discretionary budget is constantly under scrutiny. The huge
costs and, for many U.S. Citizens, tangential benefits associated with
oversea bases will only magnify this scrutiny. Consequently, in
upcoming elections, overseas military bases will become a hot button
issue.
By 2014, the DoD will transfer 8,000 Marines and 9,000 dependents
from Okinawa to the U.S. territory of Guam.147 In addition, new
military installations, costing $10.3 billion, sixty percent of which will
be paid by Japan, will be built on Guam.148 The way that the DoD bases
troops in Guam will provide insight into the way the DoD will operate in
the coming years. It may also presage the DoD's future ability to
manufacture security in its overseas military bases.

145. Reducing pollution also benefits the United States outside of the context of SOFAs.
Polluting overseas, especially ocean pollution, will eventually have a negative impact on
the United States.
146. See, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, The Big (Military)Taboo, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2010,
at WK16 (arguing, inter alia, that the United States needs less military and more
diplomacy); John Pomfret, What's The Big Idea? Closing Military Bases, WASH. POST, Apr.
5, 2009, at Dl.
147. See SHIRLEY A. KAN & LARRY A. NIKsCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RS22570, GUAM:
U.S. DEFENSE DEPLOYMENTS 3 (2009).
148. See id at 7.

